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In this article, I examined what might be called the evolutionary argument against human 
uniqueness and human dignity. After having rehearsed briefly the roots of the classical Judeo-
Christian view on human uniqueness and human dignity in the first chapters of Genesis, I 
went on to explore and delineate the nature of the evolutionary argument against this view. 
Next, I examined whether Christian theology might widen the concept of imago Dei so as 
to include other beings as well as humans, thus giving up the idea of human uniqueness. I 
concluded, however, that this move is deeply problematic. Therefore, I turned to a discussion 
of some recent attempts to define both human uniqueness and the image of God in theological 
rather than empirical terms. One of these, which is based on the concept of incarnation, is 
found wanting, but another one is construed in such a way that it enables us to reconcile the 
idea of human uniqueness as encapsulated in the doctrine of the imago Dei with contemporary 
evolutionary theory. Thus, this article can be seen as an exercise in bringing classical Christian 
theology to terms with evolution, further highlighting this theology’s ongoing vitality. 
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The biblical idea that human beings are created in the image of God and that Homo sapiens are therefore 
placed more or less at the center of the created universe seems to be especially challenged in our time. 
(Van Huyssteen 2006:116)
Introduction
During the past decade, the notions of human rights and human dignity have been at the centre of 
Koos Vorster’s scholarly attention (cf. Vorster 1999, 2000, 2001, 2006, 2008). In Christian theology, 
these notions have usually been based upon the doctrine of the imago Dei. As Vorster (2008:197), 
speaking of the Reformed tradition, observes: ‘This [human] dignity rests on the human being’s 
imago Dei.’ And Kevin Vanhoozer (1997:163) rightly applies this to Christianity in general 
when he argues that ‘Christians ground their affirmation of human dignity … in the special 
resemblance of the human creature to its Creator’. Because, according to the Genesis stories, God 
created all creatures ‘after their pattern’ but only the human being ‘in his image’, Jewish and 
Christian believers have affirmed that there is a unique dividing line between human beings, on 
the one hand, and all other species, on the other. It is this contrast which somehow undergirds the 
inviolability of human existence. Whereas God, addressing Noah and his descendants, ordered 
that ‘every moving thing that lives shall be food for you’ (Gn 9:3 NRSV), the blood of a human 
being should not be shed, ‘for in his own image God made humankind’ (Gn 9:6). Clearly, the 
suggestion is that whoever assaults a human being thereby touches God, in whose image he or 
she was made. Thus, from a theological point of view, the notions of human dignity and human 
rights are heavily dependent on the concept of the imago Dei and the connected belief in human 
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Evolusieteorie, menslike uniekheid and die beeld van God. In hierdie artikel ondersoek 
ek die sogenaamde evolusionêre argument teen menslike uniekheid en menswaardigheid. 
Na ‘n kort oorsig oor die oorsprong van die klassieke Joods-Christelike siening van menslike 
uniekheid en menswaardigheid soos uit die eerste vyf hoofstukke van Genesis blyk, ondersoek en 
beeld ek die aard van die evolusionêre argument hierteenoor uit. Vervolgens word die vraag 
ondersoek of die Christelike teologie die konsep van imago Dei sodanig kan verbreed dat dit 
ook ander wesens behalwe mense kan insluit, waardeur die idee van menslike uniekheid 
dus prysgegee word. Ek kom egter tot die slotsom dat hierdie skuif hoogs problematies is. 
Daarom wend ek my tot ’n bespreking van onlangse pogings om menslike uniekheid en die 
beeld van God eerder in teologiese as empiriese terme te definieer. Een hiervan, gebaseer op 
die konsep van inkarnasie, is te lig bevind. ‘n Ander poging is egter sodanig vertolk dat dit 
ons in staat stel om die idee van menslike uniekheid, soos ingesluit in die leerstelling van die 
imago Dei, met die hedendaagse evolusieteorie te versoen. Hierdie artikel kan dus gesien word 
as ‘n poging om die klassieke Christelike teologie in ooreenstemming te bring met evolusie en 
om hierdie teologie se voortgaande lewenskragtigheid te beklemtoon. 
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uniqueness. It is precisely this latter belief, however, which 
has come under profound suspicion and criticism as a result 
of the rise of evolutionary theory during the past century and 
a half. 
In this article, I will explore firstly the nature of this criticism. 
Next, I examine whether we might widen the concept of 
imago Dei so as to include other beings as well as humans, 
thus giving up the idea of human uniqueness. It will turn 
out, however, that this move is deeply problematic from 
a Christian theological perspective. Thirdly, some recent 
attempts to define both human uniqueness and the image 
of God in theological rather than empirical terms are 
discussed. One of these is found wanting, but another one 
is construed in such a way that it enables us to reconcile the 
idea of human uniqueness as encapsulated in the doctrine 
of the imago Dei with contemporary evolutionary theory. 
This article therefore can be seen as an exercise in bringing 
classical Christian theology to terms with evolution, thus 
highlighting its ongoing vitality (for a recent attempt to do 
something similar with regard to another part of Christian 
theology, viz. its doctrines of sin and evil, see Vorster 2011).
Human nature and the challenge of 
evolutionary theory 
Evolutionary theory has largely discredited the idea that 
human beings are radically different from animals – or from 
‘other animals’, as it is often phrased. Given the various 
kinds of extinct hominid forms of life somewhere in between 
the extant great apes and Homo sapiens, or even next to the 
human species from a taxonomical point of view (such as, 
supposedly, the Neanderthal man) it seems difficult to ascribe 
any unique-making characteristics to the human being. At 
the very least, evolutionary theory makes us suspicious of 
theories that see large gaps between humans on the one hand 
and the rest of creaturely reality on the other. In particular, 
the close links between the human being and its closest 
relative, the chimpanzee, have often been emphasised, 
especially since the stunning genetic similarity between the 
two species became clear.
 
It is often argued that evolutionary theory even leads to 
the stronger claim that there is no such thing as a ‘human 
nature’. A nature – or in the classical metaphysical jargon: 
an ‘essence’ – is an unchanging core of properties that, at 
the same time, defines a species and distinguishes it from 
all other species. But does such a notion still make sense in 
a world in which species evolve in the ways suggested by 
neo-Darwinian theory? Many argue it does not. For example, 
philosopher of biology David Hull (1989) writes:
If species evolve in anything like the way that Darwin thought 
they did, then they cannot possibly have the sort of natures that 
traditional philosophers claimed they did. If species lack general 
natures, then so does Homo sapiens as a biological species. If 
Homo sapiens lacks a nature, then no reference to biology can be 
made to support one’s claims about ‘human nature’ … Because 
so many moral, ethical, and political theories depend on some 
notion or other of human nature, Darwin’s theory brought into 
question all these theories. (pp. 171–172)
Similarly, theistic philosopher J.P. Moreland (2009), following 
up on this, argues that:
Darwinism makes it highly unlikely that there is any such thing as 
a human essence … that is identical throughout the human species. 
On a Darwinist view, both species and individual organisms all 
differ from each other, not in kind, but in degree. (p. 161) 
If this is true, however, why would we continue to group 
organisms in distinctive species? Here is Moreland’s answer: 
Evolutionary processes are slow and gradual, and where one 
draws the line that groups members together is somewhat 
arbitrary. Species turn out to be sets whose members resemble 
each other to some degree or other. (p. 162) 
Whereas for Moreland, this seems to be a reason to reject 
evolutionary theory, for most others, of course, it is a reason 
to water down any claims on humanity’s special status 
in creation. 
 
Clearly, however, if we do that it becomes questionable 
whether we can still adhere to an adequate notion of 
human dignity. For, as we mentioned, this notion is heavily 
dependent on the affirmation of human uniqueness: it is 
because human beings have a special position in creation, 
being set apart by God from all other living beings, that they 
deserve the high moral status of having inviolable rights, 
such as, in any case, the right of life. As James Rachels (1990) 
argues:
The doctrine of human dignity says that humans merit a level 
of moral concern wholly different from that to mere animals; 
for this to be true, there would have to be some big, morally 
significant difference between them. Therefore, any adequate 
defence of human dignity would require some conception of 
human beings as radically different from other animals. But that 
is precisely what evolutionary theory calls in to question … This 
being so, a Darwinian may conclude that a successful defence of 
human dignity is most unlikely. (pp. 171–172)
So, briefly put, the question is this: how can we uphold a 
viable account of human dignity in an evolutionary era? Is 
this even achievable?
Widening the concept of imago Dei?
One way to proceed here may seem a rather drastic 
one, but one that, to my mind, should nevertheless be 
carefully considered. During the past couple of years, some 
theologians have suggested that the concept of the image of 
God should be widened so as to include not only humans but 
also (non-human) animals. This is an intriguing suggestion 
in the context of our topic, because it might easily be fleshed 
out in such a way that it reverses Rachels’ argument: rather 
than corroding the conceptual basis for the defence of human 
dignity by making us humans of no more intrinsic value than 
the beasts, evolutionary theory actually urges us to ascribe 
the very same dignity that we traditionally attribute to our 
own species also to other creatures as well. Perhaps, as 
Ernst Conradie (2005) puts it: 
An affirmation of human dignity … does not require a strong 
position on human uniqueness … The inalienable dignity which 
we attach to human life may serve as a paradigm for the dignity 
(or integrity) of the whole earth community. (p. 80)
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In the first place, this may be seen to pertain to the animals. 
The recent rise of cultural and political movements in the 
West committed to the defence of ‘animal rights’ and/or 
the liberation of animals shows that this suggestion is not as 
outrageous as it would have been deemed in the past. So let 
us explore this line of thinking.
The most explicit plea for broadening the concept of 
imago Dei has recently been made by David Cunningham 
(2009). Cunningham starts his argument by rightly 
observing that the sheer existence of empirical distinctions 
between humans, on the one hand, and animals, on the 
other, is insufficient to warrant the drawing of any significant 
theological distinctions between the two. He refers to the 
fact that most of us now think it were ‘poor theological 
judgments’ (2009:102) which prompted theologians over the 
centuries to conclude, from empirical differences between 
people of different races or ethnicities, between men and 
women, or between homosexual and heterosexual people, to 
the existence of theologically important distinctions between 
these groups. Similarly, we should be very careful not to 
value animals differently from a theological perspective for 
the sole reason that ‘they look different, they act differently, 
and they are treated differently’ (2009:102). If a theologically 
relevant distinction between humans and animals should be 
maintained, there should be distinctive theological reasons for 
doing so. Now the most well-known theological reason for 
such a distinction has been the notion that human beings and 
human beings alone have been created in the image of God. 
However, we might wonder to what extent this traditional 
interpretation of the imago Dei has been influenced by 
widespread cultural assumptions on the superiority of 
the human species, based on the Aristotelian view that 
rationality and the use of language were exclusively 
human faculties. Since Darwin, we know that this view was 
wrong and therefore we have some reason to re-examine the 
imago Dei tradition, probing its biblical and theological 
warrants.
In doing so, Cunningham (2009) develops a deconstruction of 
the traditional interpretation of the image of God as limited 
to human beings in three steps. 
Firstly, he points out that, whereas the biblical text explicitly 
ascribes the image of God only to human beings, it nowhere 
denies it to other elements of creation. Therefore, we need an 
argumentum e silentio if we want to make a case for its exclusive 
ascription to human beings, and arguments from silence are 
always ‘somewhat hazardous, particularly with reference to 
the Bible’ (2009:106). 
Secondly, Cunningham (2009:107) observes that even if we 
grant that the notion of the image of God is only applied to 
the human being, its precise meaning ‘has been one of the 
more contested sites of theological reflection throughout the 
centuries’. He then goes on to conclude from this wide range 
of existing interpretations that ‘we are unable to determine its 
meaning’ (2009:110). Thus, the notion is not of much help in 
gaining a clear theological understanding of what is so special 
about humanity. 
Thirdly, Cunningham (2009) argues that even if we knew its 
theological meaning, we would still be unable to determine 
to what extent the concept of imago Dei dissociates human 
beings from (other) animals and he justifies this claim by 
pointing to the grammar of the word ‘image’. This grammar 
does not allow for sharp ‘either/or’ distinctions, because 
obviously an image can be more or less accurate. It is even 
impossible to establish at what point an attempted copy 
is so far away from its original that the language of image 
ceases to apply (Cunningham mentions the example of 
a child’s poor watercolour drawing of a painting which is 
only recognisable as a copy by its fondest parent). Moreover, 
things can be images of a person or object in very different 
ways. A photograph, for example, images a person in 
another way than a sculpture does. Finally, to complicate 
matters further, when it comes to the image of God we have 
no way to compare any copies to the original, establishing 
in this way whether some presumed image is sharp, not so 
sharp, or not an image at all. Cunningham (2009:117) ends 
his argument by concluding that claims about the creation of 
human beings in the image of God are ‘less supportive of a 
strong separation between human beings and other animals 
than might have been surmised’. 
To my mind, there is much to be learnt from Cunningham’s 
(2009) explorations. For example, he rightly points to the 
fact that there are only a few references to the image of God 
in the Hebrew Bible. In fact, there are only three of them 
(Gn 1:26–28; 5:1; 9:6), to be sure, there are seven others in 
the New Testament, but most of these assume Jesus Christ, 
rather than humanity as a whole, to be the (true) image of 
God. These data should at least make us pause before we 
overload the imago Dei concept with theological significance 
by making it into the cornerstone of theological anthropology. 
Furthermore, Cunningham also insightfully points out that, 
at other places, the Bible can just as well divide creaturely 
reality in different ways than by setting apart humanity from 
the other creatures. For example, in the story of the flood 
(Gn 6–8), there is a remnant consisting of both human beings 
and animals that is saved, whereas all other humans perish 
with the other animals. Subsequently, when God enters into a 
new covenant with Noah, this covenant explicitly includes the 
surviving animals and their offspring (Gn 9:10). Even more 
telling perhaps is the creation story from Genesis 1, according 
to which humanity was created on the very same sixth day as 
the land animals. We were not even allotted a special day for 
our own species! In this way, the creation story powerfully 
reminds us of our intimate connectedness with the (other) 
animals and our profoundly embodied nature; Darwin did 
not come up with something totally new when he reinforced 
this point, and Cunningham himself creatively underlines 
this by conceptualising the central biblical notion of the 
flesh as an umbrella term that includes both humans and the 
animals. Finally, Cunningham also convincingly argues that 
in the biblical texts not only humanity, but the rest of creation 
as well somehow reflects the ‘mark of the Maker’. In the 
famous opening verse of Psalm 19 it is said that the heavens 
are telling the glory of God and the firmament proclaims 
his handiwork. And the more sober prose of Romans 1:20, 
though its interpretation is notoriously contested, asserts 
that God’s power and divinity transpire in the things 
God has made.
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Despite all this, and despite the fact that Cunningham (2009) 
formulates his conclusions in a balanced way, clearly trying to 
avoid overstating his case, the thrust of his argument remains 
unconvincing. Let me substantiate this claim by rehearsing 
briefly his threefold argument. Firstly, Cunningham’s 
suggestion that the biblical text is silent about whether or 
not the image of God also belongs to non-human animals 
is slightly misleading, to say the least. Whereas the creation 
of both plants and animals is said to be ‘after their pattern’, 
in the case of the creation of humankind we encounter the 
words ‘in God’s image’ at the very same place as ‘after their 
pattern’. The linguistic similarity is even stronger, because 
the phrases are invariably repeated at least twice. Moreover, 
as we have seen already in Genesis 9, it is said to Noah and 
his descendants that: 
[E]very moving thing that lives shall be food for you, but that the 
blood of a human being shall not be shed; and this distinction 
is grounded in the fact that ‘in his own image God made 
humankind. (v. 6) 
Clearly, the conclusion cannot be escaped that non-human 
beings do not share in the image of God, at least not in a way 
which is poignant enough to give them a moral status of 
their own.
Secondly, there is indeed a wide variety of interpretations 
of the notion of the imago Dei both in the Christian tradition 
and in contemporary theology. The only thing that can be 
concluded from that, however, is that we should carefully 
study these interpretations in order to make up our minds 
as to which are the most plausible ones. Some of them may, 
as Cunningham (2009) himself notes, be inspired more by 
reigning cultural assumptions than by the Gospel. Other 
interpretations are perhaps not as mutually exclusive as 
one might think at first sight. However this may be, it 
seems just lazy hermeneutics to conclude from a plurality 
of interpretations to the impossibility of determining 
the meaning of a certain phrase or doctrine. In the case of 
Christian theology, such a conclusion would be particularly 
disastrous, because there is hardly any doctrinal (or ethical) 
tenet which has only one clear and generally accepted 
interpretation – one might hope that there was at least 
some unanimity on the nature and significance of the 
Christological and Trinitarian doctrines of the early Church, 
but even that is of course far from the case. So we would be 
unable to establish the content of any belief or the meaning 
of any doctrine if we had to wait until full consensus on their 
interpretation has been reached. Nor is this typical only for 
Christian theology – debates on the right interpretation of 
beliefs and practices are characteristic of all living religious 
and philosophical traditions (it is perhaps even the absence 
of such debates which might raise concerns on a tradition’s 
viability).
Thirdly, Cunningham (2009) is right in his observation that 
‘image’ is a graded notion rather than an absolute concept that 
allows for strong binary oppositions. Still, one may wonder 
what kind of theological conclusions follow from this. It is 
striking that, whilst Cunningham rightly warns against 
deriving theological conclusions from empirical observations 
about race, sex et cetera, he goes on to draw theological 
conclusions from empirical observations about language and 
grammar, even English grammar for that matter, without 
noticing how precarious this is as a theological method. As 
Wittgenstein famously argued, the meaning of language is in 
its use. Therefore, rather than asking how the word ‘image’ 
functions in English (or even Hebrew) grammar, we should 
ask in what kind of contexts and meanings it is put to use 
in the biblical texts themselves. And then again, despite all 
instructive caveats and qualifications made by Cunningham, 
which we should definitely take into account, we cannot 
escape the conclusion that, according to the biblical texts, the 
image of God is somehow uniquely present in the human 
species (in fact, Cunningham is probably one of the first 
interpreters who doubts this). Of course, we might decide to 
disconnect our own theological views from the Bible here, 
arguing that we should extend the notion of the image of 
God to the non-human realm even though the Bible does 
not do so. However, unless there is some deeper motive in 
biblical theology which justifies this move (which I do not 
see), there is an obvious price tag connected to it. Given the 
paradigmatic and normative status of Scripture in Christian 
theology, it becomes difficult to present such a view as 
standing in continuity with the Christian tradition, or to 
recommend it to the contemporary Christian community as 
a viable option.
Therefore, we still find ourselves at the very place where 
we started: Christians typically ground their affirmation 
of human dignity on the doctrine of the imago Dei, which, 
in turn, requires a conception of the human species as 
being different from all other beings. And the question 
continues to be, therefore, how we can make sense of this 
affirmation in light of the profound ways in which it is 
challenged by evolutionary theory. This question becomes 
even more urgent when we acknowledge that the image 
of God, despite the fact that this phrase only rarely occurs 
in the Bible, is nevertheless a ‘central, canonical idea’ 
(Van Huyssteen 2006:149). Drawing upon the work of James 
Luther Mays, Van Huyssteen (2006:122) argues that although 
apart from Genesis the notion of the ‘image of God’ is hardly 
used for the human being in the biblical story, ‘what it stands 
for theologically does in fact become the structural theme 
of the biblical account of God and humankind’. Indeed, the 
dramatic story in which the Bible seems most interested is 
the narrative of God’s dealings with both the people Israel 
and the entire human race. Thus, it implicitly underlines the 
uniqueness of the human species from beginning to end also 
without explicitly mentioning it or linking it to the notion of 
the imago Dei. But in what does this uniqueness reside?
 
Uniqueness as a theological 
category
If we want to retain the notion that humankind somehow 
fundamentally belongs to another category than other 
species, evolutionary theory helpfully reminds us 
that we should avoid superficial appeals to empirical 
characteristics which seem to set us apart as unique beings. As 
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David Clough (2009:156) points out in a recent contribution 
‘against human separatism’, the ‘most frequently offered 
markers of difference – rationality, intelligence, and 
language – are unable to identify a qualitative difference 
between humans and other creatures’ (2009:152). Indeed, 
contemporary research has made clear that especially some 
of the great apes also possess these capabilities in various 
(at least rudimentary) ways. Still, however, there might be 
distinctively theological reasons for considering humanity as 
somehow fundamentally different from the rest of creation. 
It is this option that we will explore in the present section.
In doing so, we should again proceed with some caution, 
because there might also be theological arguments which are 
seriously flawed. One example of this is the attempt to ground 
human uniqueness in the doctrine of the incarnation. Clough 
(2009) points to Karl Barth in this connection, according to 
whom creation is the external basis of the covenant with 
humanity established by God through Jesus Christ. That 
seems to imply a highly anthropocentric approach. Indeed, 
in his later work on The humanity of God, Barth (1960:51) 
goes as far as stating straightforwardly that, in Christ, ‘God 
is human.’ Although Barth does not use this insight to work 
out a strong notion of human uniqueness amidst the other 
living beings, Clough (2009:154) is definitely right when he 
observes that it is ‘hard to envisage a higher of more absolute 
distinction that could be established between human beings 
and the rest of creation’. He then goes on to refute the idea 
that, in the incarnation, God somehow privileges humanity. 
The way in which he does this, however, is problematic and 
even hazardous. Clough (2009:155) argues that the Church 
has already broadened its understanding of the incarnation 
by moving from the description that God became a Jew, to the 
Nicene view that God became a human being, and so it might 
just as well go one step further on this path by understanding 
the incarnation in terms of ‘God becoming a creature’. 
However, instead of considering the Church’s forgetfulness 
about Christ’s Jewishness as a form of progress, as Clough 
seems to do, we might rather regret this loss of Christological 
concreteness, especially in light of what should probably 
be seen as the dreadful anti-Semitic consequences of this 
age-old forgetfulness which culminated in the Holocaust. 
Therefore, rather than making the event of the incarnation 
even more bleak and general, we should re-appropriate its 
icky concreteness: God did not become a creature in the most 
abstract and inoffensive sense of the word, but God became a 
first-century (i.e. pre-modern), male Palestinian Jew.
 
The reason why the incarnation cannot be construed as a 
theological ground for safeguarding humanity’s unique 
dignity is that it does not refer to something which elevates 
us humans above the animals, but to something which rather 
degrades us below them, namely the fact that we alone of all 
living beings are guilty of sinning against God. For although 
there have always been dissenting voices (cf. Van Driel 2008), 
the majority view in the Christian tradition throughout the 
ages has been that the incarnation was made necessary by 
human sin. But even when one would opt for the ‘incarnation 
anyway’ view, the doctrine of sin should make us pause before 
we ascribe all kinds of unique metaphysical compliments to 
humanity. Although primatologists and (other) ethologists 
have started to ascribe some form of morality to certain 
non-human animals and, following this, some have 
even cautiously suggested the possibility of animal sin 
(cf. Deane-Drummond 2009:160–170), the Bible ascribes 
clearly the responsibility for sin to humans and humans 
alone. And clearly, ‘humanity does have a distinctive capacity 
for “sins” that outweighs anything remotely recognisable 
in nonhuman animal behaviour’ (Deane-Drummond 
2009:168). As such, according to the biblical account, the most 
conspicuous aspect in which we human beings are unique is 
our capacity for committing evil and causing suffering in the 
world. Whereas this definitely marks us off from the rest of 
creation, it is not so clear that it helps us to carve out a robust 
notion of human dignity or human rights.
Perhaps because, arguably, human beings never entirely 
coincide with their state of being sinners, there is something 
more to be said about human uniqueness from a theological 
point of view (cf. Vorster 2001:8–12, 2008:197–199). A 
promising way forward here is to re-examine the doctrine 
of imago Dei along lines which have been suggested in 
both recent biblical scholarship and Christian theological 
anthropology. Classical accounts of this doctrine famously 
tried to define some unique natural characteristic which 
allegedly distinguished human beings from other creatures. 
For example, as opposed to (other) animals, only human 
beings were supposed to possess a soul, or rationality – 
to mention only the two options which have been most 
prevalent in the theological tradition. Quite independently 
of their vulnerability to evolutionary claims, however, it has 
become clear that such ‘substantive’ theories of the image 
of God (finding the image in some substantial quality) 
cannot stand the test of exegetical scrutiny: quite simply, the 
identification of the imago Dei with either the soul or reason 
does not occur in the Bible; rather, its background is to be 
found in various forms of Greek philosophical thought. Both 
biblical scholars and systematic theologians have therefore 
come up with proposals to reinterpret the nature of God’s 
image in humanity by studying its biblical ramifications. 
Indeed, the biblical concept of imago Dei has been the object 
of intense scholarly attention in recent years (for a masterful 
survey and evaluation of the history of its interpretation, 
see Van Huyssteen 2006:111–162; cf. the only slightly earlier 
accounts in Middleton 2005 and Shults 2003). Despite 
Cunningham’s (2009) complaint about the large variety of 
interpretations, these recent examinations disclose a lot of 
overlap in that most of them point into one of two directions: 
the biblical notion of the image of God should be understood 
either in functional or in relational terms. Usually, biblical 
scholars, who focus primarily, or even exclusively, on the 
first chapters of Genesis, endorse a functional interpretation, 
whereas systematic theologians who take into account the 
entire canonical framework end up with a relational view 
(Cortez 2010:30).
 
Perhaps, however, the two of these are not as mutually 
exclusive as they are sometimes supposed to be. In any case, 
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the seminal Genesis-text links the notion of the image of 
God both to a relationship (‘male and female God created 
them’) (Gn 1:27) and to a particular function or task, viz. 
to have dominion over the animals. Because the functional 
reference, which is spelled out twice (Gn 1:26, 28), is 
arguably the more prominent and certainly the most explicit 
one, let us start there. We might then suggest that what is 
theologically distinctive about God’s human creatures is 
that they are being called to rule and have dominion over 
the earth. Understandably, from an ecological point of view, 
there continue to be worries about the harsh language which 
is used in these verses (‘subdue’, etc.). Following on from 
previous research, however, Richard Middleton (2005:89–90) 
has convincingly argued that both against the background 
of extra-biblical contemporaneous material in which the 
king figures as the image of God and in light of Genesis 1 
as a whole, the dominium terrae should not be understood as 
including the use of violence (cf. Middleton 2005:263–269; 
Van Huyssteen 2006:157–158). Rather: 
[T]he human task of exercising power over the earth is … 
modeled on God’s creative activity, which, in Genesis 1, is 
clearly developmental and formative, involving the process 
of transforming the tohû wabohû into an ordered, harmonious 
cosmos. (Middleton 2005:89) 
So it is precisely in being called to be God’s image that the 
human being is summoned to mirror the wisdom, generosity 
and creative love by means of which God made the earth into 
a habitable place. There is even a striking chiastic parallelism 
in God’s first forming and then filling the earth, on the one 
hand, and humanity’s vocation to fill and then organise the 
earth, on the other. However this may be, the Genesis account 
stands in strong contrast with the creation-by-combat myths 
from the Umwelt which, to be sure, we also find in other parts 
of the Old Testament. So here, then, we have a theological 
account of what makes humanity unique in creation, in terms 
of its royal and priestly God-given task to represent God on 
earth by being a blessing to its many inhabitants.
 
Whilst acknowledging that this might be the case, 
David Clough (2009:153) has nevertheless argued that 
this interpretation of the image of God should not be seen 
as grounds for ‘human separatism’, because ‘the Bible 
repeatedly affirms that … each living thing has a part in 
God’s purposes’. Thus, he suggests that being in the image 
of God does not make humanity more unique amongst 
God’s creatures than any other species. It is a kind of species 
specificity – the kind of distinctiveness which every species 
has by the very fact of being a species of its own – rather than 
a unique characteristic that sets humankind apart from the rest 
of creation. Whereas there certainly is a humbling element 
of truth in this argument – we should not underestimate the 
special relationships God has with the non-human parts of 
creation – it seems to me that, as a whole, it is unconvincing. 
Of course, one can always ask how specific a species must 
be to be ‘really’ unique; however, clearly, none of the 
other species has received such a huge and wide-ranging 
responsibility for the whole of creation, including the other 
animals, as humankind has. 
It is from this unique responsibility, or so I would suggest, 
that our human dignity is derived. For when it is declared 
in Genesis 9 that the human life, in contrast to the lives of 
animals, is inviolable, this is justified by means of an appeal 
to the fact that the human being is made in the image of 
God. Therefore, from a Christian point of view, we should 
reject a comprehensive moral identification of humans and 
animals (cf. Schenderling 1999). It is important, however, 
not to exchange the order here: our responsibility precedes 
and grounds our dignity, rather than the other way around. 
In this way, our dignity can never legitimately become 
a cause for arrogance or boasting, nor for maintaining a 
purely anthropocentric view of the universe. Still, both our 
responsibility towards God, and the corresponding dignity 
that God has granted us, make us into unique beings on earth.
This point can be further corroborated when we take into 
account the relational interpretation of the image of God. In 
fact, this interpretation is closely linked with the functional 
one. For we are not only destined to be God’s representatives 
on earth, consciously continuing and maintaining God’s work 
of creation, but we are also the only beings who are addressed 
by God so that we should know this (Gn 1:28, cf. 26, where 
it is only said about us). As Robert Jenson (1983:320–321) has 
argued, from a theological point of view, humans are unique 
in that God speaks not only about them, but also to them, thus 
establishing a relationship with them. This relationship turns 
out to be reciprocal, in that human beings have, from their 
earliest times, responded to their being addressed by God 
by means of ritual and prayer. As Wentzel van Huyssteen 
(2006: passim) has helpfully reminded us, our relationship to 
God is never an abstract decontextualised thing, but always 
embedded in profoundly embodied patterns of behaviour. 
Our capacity to engage in personal reciprocal relationships 
also extends to our fellow human beings and this, as well, 
can be seen as an essential element of what it means that 
we are made in God’s image (‘male and female God created 
them’). Still, if anywhere, it is in our religious propensity 
that a distinctive and unique-making natural characteristic 
of the human species can be found. Paraphrasing Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Van Huyssteen (2006) writes that: 
… humans are in fact driven to something beyond reason, a self-
transcendence, and it is this existential longing for a God who 
transcends the world that really sets human beings apart from 
other creatures. (p. 133)
Or, to quote a stunningly similar insight of John Calvin: ‘It is 
only the service of the Lord … which raises the human being 
above the animals’ (Institutes I.3.3).
So, do we after all encounter here a natural, empirical 
characteristic that defines our human uniqueness and marks us 
off from the rest of creation? To my mind, this question should 
be answered in a very careful way. For it is only from the 
theological perspective that we took that we can then discover 
such a distinctively human empirical characteristic. It may even 
be the case that, in fact, starting from this perspective, we just 
define the human being by pointing to its remarkable capacity 
for spirituality and religion, thereby simply denying hominids 
in which it is missing the status of being ‘really’ human (and 
I am not sure whether Van Huyssteen succeeds in avoiding 
this). In any case, we should be very careful, again, not to 
read into our theology some arbitrarily favoured empirical 
characteristic, and declaring that to be unique-making.
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But then, finally, we do not need to do so either, because it 
is enough to define human uniqueness from the theological 
perspective of what it means to be created in the image of God. 
As we have seen, we do not need some other, empirically based 
faculty or attribute to warrant human dignity. If we were only 
special in God’s eyes and because of our God-given tasks and 
relationships, we would still be very special – special enough 
to have inviolable rights. Clearly, however, in order to be able 
to live in these relationships and to fulfil these tasks, we have 
been endowed with many empirical characteristics which, 
though not unique-in-kind, and in that sense reminding us of 
our close ties to the animal world, are still unique-in-degree. 
As, for example, John Polkinghorne (2006:95) argues, ‘the 
consciousness of our animal cousins seems to be different 
from human self-consciousness.’ Likewise, when it comes 
to symbolic and linguistic behaviour, some have compared 
the difference between animals and humans as the difference 
between a two-dimensional and a three-dimensional use of 
them. For example, only humans can produce symbols about 
what does not exist or is not there (cf. Deane-Drummond 
2009:165). Similar arguments can be produced with respect 
to rationality (which only in human beings leads to science, 
technology, socio-political organisation and cooperation 
etc.), art, literature, music, economic behaviour, and other 
elements of ‘cultural evolution’. And, if at all, we are willing 
to ascribe features such as personhood and morality to 
animal primates, it is clear that these function at a much 
more complex, much more developed and much richer level 
in human beings. 
One might even argue that, in all these cases, the 
levels are so distinct, that ‘the differences in degree … 
amount to differences in kind’ (Polkinghorne 2006:96; cf. 
Cortez 2010:143, n. 10). And even if we resist the temptation of, 
in this way, once again looking bottom-upwards for empirical 
unique-making behavioural features, we have ample reason 
to continue to distinguish between human beings on the one 
hand and animals on the other. However, we might just as 
well follow the current fashion of speaking about ‘human 
and nonhuman animals’, thus underlining our biological 
connectedness to the other primates – for we are special 
anyhow. The stories of Genesis and evolutionary theory 
neatly converge in that both of them point to humanity as 
the astonishing culmination of the entire process of creation. 
As one evolutionary scientist, the paleoanthropologist Ian 
Tattersall (1998:188), has phrased it: ‘Homo sapiens is not 
simply an improved version of its ancestors – it’s a new 
concept.’ From the perspective of Christian theology, then, 
this uniqueness continues to undergird not only humanity’s 
special responsibility with regard to creation, but also its 
dignity and inalienable rights. 
Conclusion
After having reviewed briefly the roots of the classical Judeo-
Christian view on human uniqueness and human dignity in 
the first chapters of Genesis, I explored what might be called 
the ‘evolutionary argument’ against this view, examining 
whether, in response to this argument, Christian theology 
should widen the concept of imago Dei so as to include other 
beings as well as humans, thus relinquishing the idea of 
human uniqueness. I concluded, however, that this move is 
deeply problematic and so turned to a discussion of some 
recent attempts to define both human uniqueness and the 
image of God in theological rather than empirical terms. 
One of these attempts was found wanting, but another one, 
focusing on human relationality and responsibility, enables 
us to reconcile the idea of human uniqueness as encapsulated 
in the biblical notion of the imago Dei with contemporary 
evolutionary theory. 
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